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INTRODUCTION
There is no doubting the important history of interaction that is there to be traced between the Platonic tradition (in its widest construal) and the Hellenistic schools; or, in particular, the importance that these schools had as conversation-partners with Platonists in the post-Hellenistic period. But in this chapter I want to make the case for a degree of circumspection in our approach to understanding how these encounters relate to the (undoubted) success that Platonism came to enjoy.
It is often supposed that the very identity of Platonism was developed through the post-Hellenistic period as it learned one way or the other from its rivals; indeed, as I shall show, this assumption is effectively built into our historiography of the period. But I would like to suggest that, on the contrary, its identity is already surprisingly well defined in our earliest evidence, and that changes we might be able to discern as a result of its subsequent engagement with rival schools may as often be relatively superficial traces of a polemical move against them as a shift in theoretical commitment. (Similarly, there is no good reason to think that the other schools, including those with roots in the Hellenistic institutions, were any more open to profound philosophical change than they had been before.)
To illustrate this point, I am going to take as a case-study Eudorus' critical account of Aristotle's Categories. There are several reasons for choosing to look at this. First and foremost, it is the clearest possible example of a case in which a Platonist takes on board language from another school, but does so within an explicitly critical frame -making the point that what it is to be a Platonist ought to determine the sense to be given to material adopted from other schools, rather than being determined by it. Secondly, it is an early case of polemical engagement between Platonism and another school (and, if it is right to think that Eudorus is the first 'Platonist' of the post-Hellenistic age, then it is the very earliest there is) -which helps to make the point that the Platonism of the period under consideration in this volume has a robust adversative identity from the very beginning.
1 Finally, it is intended to question the status of the claim that Stoicism is 'the' philosophy at the nearside of the historical period covered by this volume ('From Stoicism . . .'), 2 or that Stoicism had a significance above that of other schools in the development of Platonist thought during the post-Hellenistic period. The claim obviously fails if it is intended in blandly statistic terms; 3 but neither does it seem accurate to say that Platonists were especially or essentially concerned about Stoicism above other schools (including Aristotelianism, Epicureanism, and the memory of the Sceptical Academy). What they were concerned about above all was the failure in all of these schools to see the aetiological importance of the forms; their success ('. . . to Platonism') was success in making the argument against them all.
PHILOSOPHY IN TRANSITION?
I have suggested that 'Platonism' has a fully-formed, adversative identity when we first catch sight of it in our evidence, with Eudorus in the first century BCE. But this is not how our histories have typically thought of it: for them, it gradually emerges through what they characterise as centuries of 'transition' leading from the end of the Hellenistic era to Plotinus in the mid-third century CE -a sense of transition which resonates through the title of this volume ('from . . . to . . .'). In one sense, of course, this is a perfectly benign way of describing the period. It is agreed that the philosophical landscape looks very different in 80 BCE and in 250 CE: let 'transition' name the sum of relevant changes that took place between these two dates. But such a description conceals a trap: phrased like this, it is easy to see that, if we can meaningfully apply the term 'transitional' to the postHellenistic era, we ought to be equally happy to apply it to any other philosophical period which is book-ended by intellectual climates different from one another. Indeed, given that this sort of bookending is how periodisation in our histories are established, it will turn out that any commonly recognised philosophical 'period' is a 'period of transition'. Yet we do not typically talk, just for example, of the Classical period as one of transition (between Presocratic physics and the Hellenistic schools?).
The fact is that 'transitional' as a label does not, and cannot, function as a neutral description.
In marking the chronological boundaries of a given period (from . . . to . . .), it privileges them over what happens in between, and makes them the standards by which to judge it. Post-Hellenistic philosophy offers us a good example of the negative effect that this historiographical framing can have. The 'transitional' character of post-Hellenistic philosophies has for a long time been cashed out in terms of 'eclecticism', the idea being that the various philosophers of the period developed their positions by selecting and recombining elements of earlier thought (in the first place, Plato and
Aristotle, but also then the Hellenistic schools). 4 And although this has not always been meant as a criticism, it tends to a reductivism in any case: systems so described end up as no more than the sum of those parts to which the term 'eclectic' draws our attention; as if an 'eclectic' philosophy is understood when we understand the pre-existing options from which it was concocted. For this reason, it seems to me that the reaction against the term 'eclecticism' in more recent scholarship allows for no real advance in our understanding of the philosophies to which it was applied when it replaces it with terms such as 'syncretism' or 'rapprochement' or 'absorption' -which as far as this goes do exactly the same job. 5 To the extent that they describe a process of change which is not rooted in philosophical purpose, they are all equally implicated in the overarching narrative of 'transition': they are all ways of describing the post-Hellenistic period as a bridge between our real points of interest.
In other words: if it is worth saying that post-Hellenistic philosophical systems are 'transitional', it is so because we think that they are only transitional, and have no intrinsic value to our histories. 6 But how did we come to think this? Szlezák's 'epochemachender Denker'), but no 'official' authorities either, our histories have nowhere to go: 'any living philosophical movement, composed of independent minds unfettered by an official establishment of Guardians of the faith, is,' we are told, 'going to be "eclectic".'
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Great School Theory, then, excludes periods without schools from our histories, just as Great
Man Theory excludes periods without Great Men. But one might feel inclined, not to accept the conclusion, but to question the premise; to say that Great School Theory is false to those periods, and bad history -just as Great Man Theory is false to the centuries in between (say) Plato and Plotinus. In order to write histories that can encompass it all, we need to acknowledge that philosophy is sometimes done, heroically, by Great Men; is more often organised, institutionally, by schools; but may also be carried on, collectively, by communities working without hierarchal structures.
Understanding exactly how philosophical communities of this sort operate is a question for further research and reflection beyond the limits of this chapter. 11 The more restricted, but key, point on which I want to focus for its remainder is the demonstration of the fact that, one way or another, philosophical identity was robustly and constructively maintained in the post-Hellenistic period; that philosophical systems of the time can be, and ought to be, treated as the proper study of the history of philosophy, and not transitional phases to stops elsewhere. I am going to do this by arguing that there are cases which conventional history has viewed as evidence of dependence, concession and 'transition' which are in fact exactly the opposite. At least sometimes we can see that the adoption of elements from a rival movement is part of a strategy to reinforce the difference between them. 12 Eudorus' treatment of Aristotle's Categories is, I want to argue, an especially clear example.
EUDORUS ON THE CATEGORIES
The Categories of Aristotle is unique in the post-Hellenistic age for having attracted sustained engagement, perhaps even lemmatic commentary, from philosophers who at the same time placed themselves at a distance from the tradition to which it belonged. καὶ Εὔδωρος δὲ τῷ περὶ τῆς οὐσίας λόγῳ τὸν περὶ τῆς ποιότητος λόγον καὶ μετὰ τοῦτον τὸν περὶ τοῦ ποσοῦ συνεζεῦχθαί φησιν· τὴν γὰρ οὐσίαν ἅμα τῷ ποιῷ καὶ ποσῷ συνυφίστασθαι, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τὴν χρονικήν τε καὶ τοπικὴν κατηγορίαν παραλαμβάνεσθαι· πᾶσαν γὰρ οὐσίαν ποῦ τε εἶναι καὶ ποτέ, δηλονότι τὴν αἰσθητήν.
Eudorus too 15 says that the account of quality and, after this, quantity is joined onto the account of substance: for a substance is constituted along with its quality and quantity. After this are taken the categories of time and place: for every substance -he means perceptible substance, of course -is in some place and time.
Eudorus' disagreement with the normal Aristotelian (and, incidentally, the Stoic) view that the Categories is a work concerned with language is evident here: he takes the 'categories' to be terms of ontological analysis. What is more, he linked the categories, at least those mentioned in this text, to a certain kind of substance, namely perceptible substance. 16 As far as that goes, he presumably thinks that the Aristotelians have simply misunderstood the intentions of Aristotle.
But there is also criticism of Aristotle himself in this passage. Most strikingly, it asserts that the categories should be taken in an order different from that in which Aristotle set them out.
Aristotle lists them at Categories 1b25-7 as: substance, quantity, quality, relation, where, when, disposition, possession, action and affection. Eudorus thinks that the first five, at least, ought to be:
substance, quality, quantity, time and place. In other words, quantity and quality are transposed, as are where ('place') and when ('time'); 17 and the latter two are promoted above the category of the 'relative', which is not mentioned here at all.
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But does any of this matter? How deep does the criticism go? We are talking about a list after all -and it is not as if Aristotle himself claimed that the order made any difference. Recent commentators on Eudorus have tended to assume, therefore, that it does not in fact matter very much. Eudorus at best is engaged in some tidying-up here: shuffling things into an order that answers to our normal analytical practices, but has no philosophical import of its own.
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This tendency to trivialise Eudorus' arguments evidently plays to the assumption that Eudorus (like others of his time) is a 'transitional' thinker: the less these criticisms have substance, the more it will seem obvious that 'absorption' or 'syncretism' is the point. Yet this seems to me precisely the reductio ad absurdum of the 'transitional' model: for (to read it the other way round) the more such an approach succeeds in demonstrating 'syncretism', the less it allows there to be any philosophical purpose behind it at all. 20 At the limit of this argument, the 'absorption' or 'syncretism' comes to exist entirely as an end in itself. The philosophy it describes is no longer 'in transition': it is nothing but transition.
What is more, there is some prima facie reason to suppose that there is more going on here than such an account can encompass. For as soon as we know that Eudorus is reading the Categories as an ontological work (remembering that this must be a self-consciously adopted position, since the Aristotelians themselves disagreed with it), it ought to strike us as significant that he has removed the category of the 'relative' from the new group of five he has created. the Categories is not a work about language but a careless ontological one has no claim on our philosophical interest in its own right; it is philosophically compelling only and precisely as a critical explanation of how post-Hellenistic Aristotelians came to lose sight of intelligible substance altogether (to the extent indeed that they came to read the Categories itself as nothing more than a study in words). 27 As an act of polemical appropriation, Eudorus' engagement with the Categories does not blur the division between Platonist and Aristotelian, but presupposes and affirms it. For this to be possible, there must be a strong and prior sense of purpose and philosophical identity in Eudorus -a 'formal' identity which is not built up from its 'material' appropriations and influences but which, on the contrary, controls them. 17 There is of course a further 'emendation': in common with ps.-Archytas, Eudorus substitutes 'time' and 'place' for Aristotle's 'when' and 'where'. The philosophical motivation for this is not obvious, although it might be intended to reinforce the ontological rather than the linguistic account of the categories -considering them as designed to identify the concrete effects of certain causes, rather than the sort of answer appropriate to particular questions. 18 Commentators, beginning with Simplicius himself, note that ps.-Archytas also adopts a nonAristotelian order of the Categories which has in common with Eudorus (1) that it begins substance-quality-quantity; (2) that it adopts the names 'time' and 'place' for Aristotle's 'when' and 'where'; and (3) that it reverses the order of this latter pair (to read: place-time). But it might be dangerous to build too much on the back of these similarities (as e.g. 22 Griffin (2015: 90) suggests that the continuation of this passage, which proposes a 'metaphysical' reading of the non-substance categories, may itself be from Eudorus. But the formula with which it is introduced (καὶ ῥητέον ὅτι . . .) is a standard way for the commentator to introduce his own response to a problem just raised. In other words, the 'metaphysical' reading is part of Simplicius'
reply to Eudorus, rather than part of the report of Eudorus' own views. For parallels in 'Middle'
Platonism to the idea that everything in the sensible world falls under the 'relative', see especially the anonymous commentator on the Theaetetus at col. 68. 
